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Abstract—Android apps require permissions when accessing
resources related to privacy or system integrity. Starting from
Android 6, these permissions have to be asked at runtime.
However, migrating to the new permission model poses multiple
challenges for developers. First, developers have to discover
where the app uses permissions, which requires a permission
specification. To date several such specifications have been built,
yet these are either imprecise, incomplete or don’t support all
types of protected resources.
We first present DPSPEC, a novel permission specification built
from several documentation formats supplied with the Android
SDK. Compared with the state the art specification, it contains
2.5x as many entries for protected methods and detects dangerous
permission usages in more than twice as many apps.
A second challenge for developers is where to insert permis-
sion requests, with possible locations restricted by the request
mechanism.
We also present DPERM1, a static analysis for Android apps
that recommends locations for permission requests in code. It
achieves high precision through context sensitivity and improves
recall through a general call graph augmentation algorithm for
incomplete code. Our empirical evaluation on 32 apps shows a
precision of 96% and recall of 89%.
I. INTRODUCTION
Android apps require permissions to access resources re-
lated to user privacy or system integrity, such as Camera, GPS,
Calendar. Up to Android 5, the user was presented with the
list of required permissions at app installation time. He had
only two choices: to grant all requested permissions and to
install the app, or to reject them and cancel the installation.
This static permission model had security and privacy
issues. It made it easy for apps to ask for more permissions
than needed. The problem was exacerbated by incomplete
permission documentation [1] that made developers unsure of
what permissions their app really needs. As a result, about
one third of apps were over-privileged [2]. This increased
the chance that malware can abuse granted permissions to
perform malicious activities [3, 4]. Even when apps used
granted permissions, users might have disagreed with the way
they are used. A study conducted on Android 4.1 [5] shows
that users would block one third of app accesses to protected
resources, if they would have this choice.
To address these issues, the permission model was over-
hauled in Android 6. Apps now ask permissions as needed, at
runtime. Users can now make informed decisions whether to
1Renamed to comply with submission policy.
grant permissions based on the context in which permissions
are used, reducing the risk of abuse.
However, migrating apps to the new model requires non-
trivial effort from app developers. Next we describe the two
main challenges they face, and our proposed solutions.
A. The Permission Specification
The first challenge for developers is to identify where their
app uses protected resources. These resources represent spe-
cific Android SDK methods or fields. The problem is compli-
cated by the lack of a centralized permission specification for
Android [6], consisting of mappings from protected resources
to permissions. In addition, the problem is complicated by
incomplete documentation. Exhaustively testing the app in
attempt to detect crashes might not be enough, because most
protected resources don’t throw exceptions if they are accessed
without permissions. Instead, they return null or empty results.
Overwhelmed by these problems, developers often ask help on
StackOverflow [7, 8].
Building a permission specification for Android is an active
area of research. It started with Stowaway [2], which in-
ferred required permissions through unit testing and feedback
directed API fuzzing. PScout [9] produced the specification
through reachability analysis of Android Framework code, on
a simple class hierarchy(CHA)-based call graph. PScout speci-
fication was significantly more complete. However, evaluation
of the most recent state of the art Axplorer [10] shows that
PScout specification suffers from imprecision. Axplorer adds
a number of enhancements on top of PScout that dramatically
improve precision. In addition, Axplorer is the only work in
this list that supports Android 6. Yet, as we show in this paper,
Axplorer suffers instead from significant incompleteness. In
addition, it only supports protected methods, but not fields.
For these reasons we decided to build our own permission
specification, hereafter called DPSPEC. Unlike the previous
work [2, 9, 10], we collected it from various documenta-
tion formats provided by Android: Java annotations, XML
annotations and Javadoc comments. We use a semi-automated
approach that involves both automated tools for collecting
references to permissions, as well as manual inspection. When
facing ambiguities, we interpreted the documentation conser-
vatively, according to a precise methodology. In addition, we
inferred a small number of mappings by analyzing the source
code of 22 apps from f-droid.org, an app store alternative
to Google Play. In this process we built a highly precise
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and most complete specification for dangerous permissions
currently available, and the first to include protected fields.
We also compared DPSPEC and Axplorer specification in
terms of absolute size and coverage of protected resource
usages in apps. In size comparison, DPSPEC contains 120
mappings for protected methods alone, compared to 45 for
Axplorer. In coverage comparison, DPSPEC helps detecting
protected method usages in more than twice as many apps as
Axplorer. Both comparisons provide evidence that DPSPEC is
more complete.
B. Locations for Permission Requests
The second challenge faced by developers is where to
insert permission requests. Due to their mechanism of action,
permission requests can typically be placed only at the end
of callbacks — events initiated by the system. Thus, devel-
opers have to propagate the requests from places where the
protected access is necessary to places where a request can be
performed. This can be non-trivial when protected resources
are nested deep inside call chains that extend into third party
code. Possibly for these reasons, as of Nov. 2016, only 25%
of the 1980 apps from f-droid.org were migrated to Android
6, as we show in this paper.
We present DPERM, a static analysis tool for recommending
locations where permission requests have to be inserted.
To achieve high precision, it performs reachability analysis
starting from callbacks, on a context sensitive call graph. A
special challenge when analyzing Android apps is lack of
access to Android SDK source code, which could lead to
vastly incomplete call graphs and consequently low recall. To
mitigate this difficulty, DPERM augments the call graph with
safe edges where possible, using a simple re-usable algorithm.
We rigorously evaluated precision and recall of DPERM
on a corpus of 32 apps, using a combination of specialized
static analysis tools and manual inspection. DPERM achieves
a precision of 96% and recall of 89%. We also provide
justification for instances when false positives or negatives
were found. Moreover, we evaluated the effect of context-
sensitivity on the tool’s precision and we found that context-
sensitivity reduces the number of false positives 4-fold.
C. Contributions
This paper makes the following main contributions:
1) DPSPEC: the most complete specification for dangerous
permissions currently available (§III).
2) DPERM: A static analysis tool for recommending per-
mission request locations (§IV).
3) Empirical evaluation: We rigorously measure the pre-
cision and recall of DPERM on a corpus of real-world
apps (§V).
and the following side contributions:
1) A comparison in size and coverage between DPSPEC
and Axplorer specification (§VI-A).
2) A small scale study of declaratively over-privileged apps
(§VI-B).
1 import static android.Manifest.permission.CAMERA
;
2 import static android.content.pm.PackageManager.
PERMISSION_GRANTED;
3
4 public class CameraActivity extends Activity {
5 private static final int REQ_CODE = 1;
6
7 protected void onCreate(...) {
8 if (checkSelfPermission(CAMERA)
9 != PERMISSION_GRANTED) {
10 requestPermissions(
11 new String[]{CAMERA}, REQ_CODE);
12 } else {
13 takePicture();
14 }
15 }
16
17 private void takePicture() {
18 if (USE_INTERNAL_CAMERA) {
19 CameraManager cm =
20 this.getSystemService(CameraManager.
class);
21 cm.openCamera(...); // method sensitive
22 ...
23 } else {
24 startActivity(
25 new Intent( //parametric sensitive
26 MediaStore.ACTION_IMAGE_CAPTURE//field
sensitive
27 ));
28 ...
29 }
30 }
31
32 public void onRequestPermissionsResult(int
reqCode, ..., int[] grantResults) {
33 if(reqCode == REQ_CODE
34 && grantResults[0]== PERMISSION_GRANTED)
{
35 takePicture();
36 } else {
37 //show explanation msg and close activity
38 }
39 }
40 }
Fig. 1: Permission request example with method and field
sensitives
We plan to publish our tools, the evaluation corpora, and
the detailed empirical results2.
II. BACKGROUND
Up to Android 5, apps declared permissions in their mani-
fest file, and were granted permissions during installation. This
often led to well known privacy and over-privilege issues [2].
To give users more control, starting with Android 6, permis-
sions were divided into two categories. Normal permissions,
like VIBRATE or INTERNET are still granted at installation.
Dangerous permissions [11], which control access to privacy-
sensitive resources, have to be requested at runtime, ideally
immediately before accessing a feature that requires them [12].
There are 24 dangerous permissions in total; examples are
CAMERA, ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION, READ_CALENDAR.
2Removed to comply with double blind submission policy.
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A typical permission request pattern is shown in Fig-
ure 1. Method onCreate() is a callback, e.g. is system-
invoked. On line 8 the app checks whether it has access to
CAMERA. If it doesn’t, it requests the permission through
requestPermissions() and the current callback ends.
Method requestPermissions() does not request per-
missions immediately. Instead, it schedules a permission re-
quest event, to be executed immediately after current callback
terminates. For this reason, any code that follows after per-
mission request cannot depend on these permissions. Most
typically, permission request is the last code to be executed
in the callback. If on line 8 permission is already granted,
takePicture() is invoked, where camera access happens.
After the permission request event, the system calls
onRequestPermissionsResult() on line 32. If per-
missions are granted, apps execute the code that uses them.
In our case it is the same takePicture(). If permissions
are rejected, apps typically display an explanation message
and revert to state prior to the action that initiated permission
request. Alternatively, apps might disable the functionality
requiring permissions, or shut down entirely, if permissions
are critical for basic functioning.
In this paper we call code locations that access protected
resources sensitives. Method takePicture() contains two
kinds of sensitives: a method sensitive on line 21 and an
field sensitive on line 26. As expected, method sensitives are
associated with specific methods, while field sensitives - with
specific fields. In addition, we call parametric sensitives the
set of methods that can take sensitive fields as arguments.
In the example, the parametric sensitive is the constructor of
Intent. The code requiring permissions is actually the call
to parametric sensitive, if the parameter is a protected field.
There are several types of field sensitives, based on their
broad functionality. The first type is intent actions. They are
used to start other activities. In our example, lines 24-27 open
a system-managed activity to take a picture. The second type
is associated with broadcast receivers and are used to receive
external notifications. And the third type is URI sensitives,
which identify various collections of data provided by the
system, such as contacts or calendar. In addition, we identified
a few specialized cases where a method requires permissions
depending on received arguments. We modeled them similarly.
Method and field sensitives map to 22 out of 24 dangerous
permissions documented in [11]. They can be detected through
customized reachability analysis and are the focus of the
present paper. The remaining two are storage permissions, not
associated with a particular Android SDK field or method.
They are required when app accesses a file outside internal
cache directory. Precisely detecting storage sensitives requires
distinguishing between internal and external file accesses. This
in turn requires full-fledged dataflow analysis; we leave it for
future work.
As a last note, the behavior when a sensitive is accessed
without permissions is very inconsistent. This is an extra
challenge for migrating apps. Only a small subset of sensitives
throw SecurityException, making them easy to spot and
fix. Other sensitives return either null or an empty list. And
for many broadcast receivers, if permissions are not granted,
the app simply doesn’t receive any notifications. These de-
sign decisions were made to allow revoking permissions for
Android 5 apps when run on Android 6 phones. Yet on long
term this only complicated proper testing and increased the
likelihood that apps might end up improperly migrated.
III. MINING THE PERMISSION SPECIFICATION
In this section we present DPSPEC, a permission specifi-
cation collected from multiple annotation and documentation
sources in Android SDK.
A. Mappings from Android Annotations
With Android 6, Google recognized the need to formally
document permissions. They introduced two formats for this.
One is through Java annotation @requirePermissions
attached to a protected method or field. It can be used in
either Android SDK, Google libraries or 3rd party libraries.
The second format is through a set of XML files supplied with
Android SDK, which essentially duplicate Java annotations in
the SDK, for technical reasons. The two versions are not nec-
essarily in sync, the XML version being more often updated.3
To get the most complete and up to date specification, we
decided to use XML metadata for Android SDK and Java
annotations for Google Play Services library. After filtering
out non-dangerous permissions, we produced 44 mappings for
Android SDK and 46 for Google Play.
B. Coverage Evaluation
Unsure of how complete is this specification, we decided to
evaluate at high level how many sensitives used in apps have
correspondents in DPSPEC. For this we used the following key
observation. In the most common usage pattern, a dangerous
permission should appear in 3 domains (places) inside an app.
First, it should be declared in the manifest file:
<uses-permission android:name=
"android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION"/>
Second, it should appear inside a permission request:
activity.requestPermissions( new String[]{
Manifest.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION},
...);
Third, the app should have a sensitive that consumes this
permission, like:
locationManager.getLastKnownLocation(...)
If a permission appears in the manifest and the request, but
there are no sensitives to consume it, this is a strong indication
that the app indeed contains a sensitive for this permission, but
this sensitive is not in DPSPEC.
Permission Collector tool: We implemented a simple tool
that analyzes a list of apps (through their apk files) and
enumerates the permissions used in the three locations above.
The tool analyzes the code in the app and in any linked 3rd
3Discussions with Google engineers, 2017.
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party libraries, but not in Android SDK. For simplicity, instead
of permission requests (place 2) it counts all references to a
particular permission in the code. For the purpose of coverage
evaluation, we are interested in permissions having one of
the following two usage scenarios. If, in a certain app, a
permission appears in the manifest, in Java code (presumably
permission request) and is consumed by a sensitive, we call it
a MCS permission instance. If the permission appears in the
manifest and code only, it is a MC permission instance.
F-droid apps corpus: For all the needs in this paper, we
extracted a corpus of 106 apps from f-droid.org, a popular
unofficial app store. For this study, f-droid has a number of
advantages over Google Play. (i) It contains only open-source
apps. (ii) There are no restrictions against downloading all
the apps or a subset using a batch tool. Google Play does
not allow this. (iii) For every apk build f-droid provides the
corresponding source code. Thus, after performing some static
analysis on the apk file, it is easy to do a follow-up manual
inspection of the source code. At the moment the apps were
extracted (Nov 2016) the store contained 1980 apps. Out
of them, 500 apps (25%) were migrated to Android 6 or
later. Most apps don’t use any dangerous permissions. Our
corpus consists of the subset of apps satisfying the following
conditions: (a) they declare target API level 23, e.g. Android
6. and (b) they have at least one dangerous permission other
than storage, declared in the manifest. F-droid also contains
apps with target API level above 23. We did not include them,
to avoid dealing with multiple versions of Android.
First coverage results: The results of running the permis-
sion collector over the corpus were rather unexpected. There
were 80 MC permission instances across 54 apps, and only
44 MCS instances across 33 apps. We define the permissions
coverage as the number of MCS instances in the corpus
divided by the number of MC+MCS instances. Consequently,
the coverage was only 35%. Our specification was vastly
incomplete. As we later discovered from discussions with
Google engineers, annotations only cover a subset of sensi-
tives that throw SecurityException when called without
permissions. They don’t cover sensitives with other behavior
mentioned in §II.
C. Mappings from Javadoc
After briefly analyzing a few apps it was clear that Android
SDK contains many more protected members, with permission
requirements documented in Javadoc. We built another tool,
Javadoc Miner, to mine permission mappings from Javadoc
semi-automatically. It analyzes Javadoc comments in Android
SDK source code, looking for permission identifiers. The tool
collects a map from Java elements to permissions mentioned in
their Javadoc. Such elements could be either methods, fields or
classes. Some identifiers, like ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION,
are uniquely associated with permissions. More generic ones,
like CAMERA, could appear in multiple contexts. At least for
this reason, a manual inspection was required to decide which
comments really represent permission requirements. After
inspecting all discovered methods and fields with permission
references, we added to DPSPEC 47 mappings.
In addition to those, Javadoc Miner produced 11 map-
pings for classes. They had to be converted to mappings
for member fields/methods to be usable. Therefore, to infer
the members, we manually inspected Javadoc documentation
in sensitive classes. In a few classes, like SipManager
sensitive members are explicitly mentioned in Javadoc. For
SubscriptionManager, Javadoc states that all public
methods are sensitives. But for most classes there are no
such clarifications. For them we conservatively collected all
members whose functionality indicates access to a protected
resource, that is not mandatory preceded by a call to another
sensitive. For example for class Camera we only added
mappings for two versions of static method open that return
an object of type Camera, but not for instance methods. In
order to access any instance method, a call to open would
be required first, thus instance methods were not primary
sensitives. Finally, for classes that primarily contain URI
sensitives, like ContactsContract, we added mappings
for every public field of type URI they contain. Any of
them can be used independently of other sensitives to access
protected data. In total, we extracted 69 additional mappings
for permissions documented at class level.
When running permission collector on the extended speci-
fication, there were 27 MC permission entries left across 22
apps.
D. Mappings inferred from apps
One more way to improve DPSPEC was to inspect the
source code of the 22 apps above and to search for sensi-
tive candidates. For each sensitive candidate we found, we
searched it’s name on StackOverflow, to confirm our finding.
We looked for code examples where author explicitly states
that certain permissions are required to access the sensitive
candidate. If we could find such examples, we would add the
candidate to DPSPEC. In some cases, when we discovered
a class with multiple URI fields that access the same broad
protected resource, we added all of them to DPSPEC. This
way we produced 32 more mappings. Full specification thus
far had 120 mappings for methods and 118 for fields. Running
coverage analysis produced 18 MC instances across 13 apps,
and 106 MCS entries across 75 apps. Thus the coverage was
85%.
These remaining 18 MC instances could be divided into
following categories. Either the app really doesn’t contain
sensitives for the permission, suggesting that it might be
under development. Or the app communicates with other
Android services through JavaScript code, and sensitives are
presumably located in those services. In some cases apps
directly accesses native code related to protected resources.
And we found one case when the app would access sensitive
resources in the Android framework layer, which is not part
of public Android SDK, through reflection. All these cases are
outside the scope of the present study.
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IV. DPERM: THE SENSITIVES ANALYSIS
The purpose of DPERM is to help migrating apps from
Android 5 to Android 6 by recommending permission request
insertion points. Due to the way permission requests work
(§II), the safest place to insert them is directly inside callbacks.
In a nutshell, DPERM is a reachability analysis built on top
of Soot [13] and FlowDroid [14] ecosystem. The analysis
starts from callbacks — a set of methods in the app that are
called by Android framework when various user- or system-
generated events occur. For every callback, DPERM performs
an inter-procedural call graph traversal and determines the set
of reachable sensitives. These in turn lead to specific lines
of code and permissions that have to be checked inside each
callback. For evaluation purposes, (§V) DPERM also outputs
call paths from callbacks to sensitives.
At high level our analysis consists of three steps. First,
DPERM generates an entry point for the analyzed app, suitable
for call graph generation (Subsection IV-A). It then passes the
entry point to out of the box tools, to generate a call graph
and a context-sensitive points-to analysis. Finally, DPERM
performs reachability analysis on the call graph and infers per-
mission request insertion points (Subsection IV-C). Additional
subsections describe various other aspects of our analysis.
A. Entry point generation
Reachability analysis for Java typically starts from the main
method. But there is no single main method in Android.
Instead, an app contains a large number of callbacks in
multiple components, invoked by Android system. A typical
way to bridge the gap is to generate a main method that
simulates invocations of all callbacks.
DPERM uses a custom version main method generation
algorithm from FlowDroid. FlowDroid algorithm strives to
accurately model the execution order of various callbacks in-
side Activity. This is required for flow-sensitive taint analysis.
Yet our early experiments showed that it misses more than
half of the callbacks. This is because FlowDroid main method
generation does not support Fragment component and many
Android callbacks defined in interfaces.
Conversely, for DPERM we strived to achieve a good recall,
while using an Android framework model just good enough
for our goal. For this reason we designed a simpler algorithm
that traverses all classes in the app and collects the callback
methods, defined as following.
A method C.f() is considered callback by DPERM if it
either:
• Overrides a method from an Android class.
• or:
– Implements a method from an Android interface I
and
– There is an object of type C that is passed as
argument to a method expecting a formal parameter
of type I.
This might look like an over-approximation, but we found
that any time an app-level class overrides a method from
Android SDK, this method is expected to be called by the
framework. There is only one case to our knowledge when
treating such methods as callbacks is undesirable: AsyncTask
and other asynchronous constructs, which we discuss later.
For the purpose of callback detection, Android class-
es/interfaces are all those located in packages android.
and com.google.android, except aforementioned asyn-
chronous constructs. The only source of imprecision that we
are aware of is including in the analysis unused code, e.g.
classes derived from Android SDK classes but not used in the
app. We leave this case for future work.
After collecting the list of callbacks, DP-detect passes it to
FlowDroid infrastructure to generate the main method.
B. Modeling sensitives
DPERM models both method and field sensitive instances
in a unified way, as call sites. Method sensitive instances
are, expectedly, any calls to methods that require permissions.
Field sensitive instances are calls to parametric sensitives (§II)
whose sensitive argument may be a field requiring permissions.
To illustrate this with an example, in the code below only the
first line is a sensitive:
new Intent(SENSITIVE_FIELD);
new Intent(SAFE_FIELD);
print(SENSITIVE_FIELD);
Here constructor of Intent is a parametric sensitive and
SENSITIVE_FIELD is the field requiring permissions.
When sensitive argument is a local variable, we perform
an intra-procedural dataflow analysis to determine possible
values assigned to the variable. If any of them is a field with
permissions, the analyzed call site is considered a sensitive.
C. Reachability analysis
For precise reachability analysis DPERM needs a context-
sensitive call graph. Unfortunately Soot framework doesn’t
provide suitable out of the box solutions. 4 Instead, it includes
SPARK [16], a widely used context-insensitive call graph con-
structor, and GEOM [17], a 1-CFA context-sensitive points-to
analysis that uses SPARK under the hood. By combining these
two tools we achieved the desired level of precision.
After generating the entry point, DPERM builds a call graph
and points-to analysis. It then performs a forward reachability
traversal from each callback to sensitives. The tool then
compiles collected paths into a report containing the lines of
code directly inside each callback, for which permissions are
required.
To achieve context sensitivity, the reachability algorithm re-
fines the context-insensitive set of edges produced by SPARK
with the context-sensitive points-to data given by GEOM.
More precisely, if a method call a.f() in the call graph
contains edges to two implementations A.f() and B.f(),
but points-to data for a in the current context equals {B},
then DPERM only traverses the edge to B.f().
4In the past Soot included PADDLE[15] context-sensitive call graph con-
structor, but it is incompatible with latest Soot and has poor performance.
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void callback1() {
new Thread(new Runnable() {void run() {
SENSITIVE();
}}).start();
}
void callback2() {
new Thread(new Runnable() {void run() {
safe();
}}).start();
}
Fig. 2: Code example requiring 1-CFA context sensitivity
class MyActivity extends Activity {
void onCreate() {
MyView v = this.findViewById(...);
v.callSensitive();
}
}
class MyView extends View {
void callSensitive() {
LocationManager lm = this.getContext().
getSystemService(...);
lm.getLastLocation();
}
}
Fig. 3: Example sensitive reachable after call graph augmen-
tation
Context sensitivity is essential for handling Java and
Android asynchronous constructs, such as Thread,
ExecutorService, Handler and AsyncTask.
Consider the example in Figure 2. Without context
sensitivity, Thread.start() in both contexts would reach
the sensitive method, flagging both callbacks as requiring
permisisons. 1-CFA level, combined with customizations
presented next, is enough to resolve such ambiguities.
D. Call graph augmentation with safe edges
The source code supplied with Android SDK for packages
android. and java. does not contain any implementation.
Instead, it contains just the members visible to the user, with
stub, e.g. empty implementations of all methods. This lessens
computation effort for call graph generation, but the result
is vastly incomplete. In particular, SPARK will not generate
any edges for a method call a.f() if no allocation site can
be inferred for values of a. At the same time, most method
and parametric sensitives are instance methods for classes
instantiated within the framework, like CameraManager in
Figure 1. With only the tools presented so far, almost no
sensitives would be reached.
In addition, many app-defined classes are instantiated
by the framework, based on various XML configuration
files. We present an example in Figure 3, distilled from
real-life code. Object v is instantiated by the system in-
side findViewById. Since DPERM doesn’t have ac-
cess to the implementation of findViewById, SPARK
won’t be able to find allocation sites for v, and won’t
create the edge for callSensitive(). The sensitive
lm.getLastLocation() will be unreachable. This lim-
itation was also acknowledged by other research using call
graph reachability [18].
To partially alleviate the issue, DPERM augments the call
graph with additional edges for every call site that (a) doesn’t
have any edges produced by SPARK, and (b) can be un-
ambiguously resolved to only one method based on class
hierarchy alone. This operation is done as post-processing,
after SPARK execution.
The call graph still doesn’t contain edges for polymorphic
call sites which could be properly processed by SPARK, but
can only be reached through other edges, added during post-
processing. We expect that this last limitation can be fixed
if augmentation technique would be integrated directly into
SPARK. We plan to implement this, yet it is a non-trivial
engineering task, outside the scope of this paper.
E. Modeling asynchronous constructs
To properly analyze asynchronous constructs, we replaced
stub implementations with hand-crafted implementations, con-
taining just enough information to generate expected call graph
edges.
For example, we crafted the following straightforward im-
plementation for Thread.start():
void start() {
target.run();
}
Note that it makes the caller of start() the immediate
context of statement target.run(). As a result, 1-CFA
context sensitivity is enough to properly traverse the code in
Figure 2.
V. DPERM EVALUATION
In our evaluation we address the following research ques-
tions:
RQ1: What is the recall of DPERM?
RQ2: What is the precision of DPERM?
RQ3: What is the effect of 1-CFA points-to refinement
on precision?
Corpus: We picked all apps from our permission mining
corpus (§III-B) that only contain MCS permission instances.
These are the apps most likely to be properly migrated to
Android 6 and use only the standard permission request
pattern, that we support. This way we avoided improperly
migrated apps, apps that contain many unreachable sensitives,
apps that use permissions with inter-app communication or the
apps for which we could not find all the sensitives (§III-A).
This resulted in a list of 35 apps. Out of them, we left out
another three apps because they were: (a1) crashing DPERM
with OutOfMemoryError, (a2) we couldn’t build Android
Studio project for it, required for manual inspection, (a3) was
a duplciate of another app in the corpus. Our final corpus, used
for all three RQs, consists of the remaining 32 apps. It includes
7 permissions and 41 (app, permission) instances. The average
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Sensitives Method Field Total
Detected 49 23 72
Undetected, valid sensitive 8 1 9
Undetected, invalid sensitive 0 6 6
CHA-unreachable 9 0 9
Recall 86% 96% 89%
TABLE I: Summary for recall evaluation
execution time per app was 3.6 minutes, on a quad-core 3.5
Ghz processor with 16 GB of RAM.
A. RQ1: What is the recall of DPERM?
We used a combination of helper tools and manual in-
spection to decide which of the undetected sensitives are
truly unreachable and which are false negatives. This hybrid
approach allowed us to decrease the amount of manual work
and reduce the chance of human errors.
Helper tools:We already have the Permission Collector tool
(§III-B) that finds all sensitives in the app. The difference be-
tween all sensitives and those detected by DPERM would make
potentially undetected sensitives. They need further inspection
to be categorized as either false negatives or true negatives.
To filter out some of them automatically, we designed a
simple class hierarchy-based reachability analysis tool that
starts from the same dummy main method as DPERM and uses
class hierarchy data alone to resolve virtual calls. These tools
together divide the set of all sensitives into three partitions:
(a) unreachable, (b) CHA-reachable but undetected and (c)
detected by DPERM.
Manual inspection: We next manually inspected all CHA-
reachable but undetected sensitive instances in our corpus,
to determine which of them represent actually reachable
sensitives, and thus false negatives. For field sensitives we
first inspected whether they are actually used to access a
protected resource. During this process, we occasionally found
new methods that accept sensitive fields to access protected
resources. We used them to extend our specification of para-
metric sensitives. Then, for both field and method sensitives
we searched for possible call paths from callbacks. If there was
at least one feasible path, we considered the sensitive a false
negative. If we could not determine if a sensitive is reachable
due to code complexity, we gave it benefit of the doubt and
counted as reachable.
Results: Table I presents the results. We collected 72 de-
tected sensitives, 9 valid but undetected sensitives and 6 invalid
sensitives. Since it is hard to count the missing paths for valid
undetected sensitives, we consider the unit of our evaluation
a sensitive. This leads to a recall of 72
72+9
× 100% = 89%.
Field sensitives that were filtered out all represent references to
fields that do not result in access to protected resources. Valid
undetected methods are caused by one of the two reasons:
(a) call graph incompleteness due to lack of access to android
internals (§IV-D) or (b) benefit of the doubt. The only instance
of a valid undetected field is caused by a more complex type
of parametric sensitive that depends of two parameters, that
Sensitives Method Field Total
Detected 49 23 72
With non-ambiguous paths only 28 13 41
With non-ambiguous and valid ambiguous
paths
19 9 28
With invalid paths 2 1 3
Total with valid paths only 47 22 69
Precision 96% 96% 96%
TABLE II: Summary for precision evaluation
DPERM does not support. Adding support would be a localized
engineering task.
B. RQ2: What is the precision of DPERM?
In this section we evaluate the precision of DPERM, as
a ratio of sensitives for which all detected paths are valid
divided by the total number of detected sensitives. We take the
sensitive as unit of precision, rather than path or permission
request insertion location, because the total number of paths
and reported request locations differs widely from one app to
another. For most apps DPERM reports only one path, while
for a few - 20-30 paths. Thus, we prevent our evaluation results
to be dominated by a few apps.
Here we also used a mix of tools and manual inspection.
Helper tools: For every path from callback to sensitive
DPERM computes one more boolean flag: whether the path
is ambiguous. A path is ambiguous if it contains at least one
method call that in the path’s context can be resolved to more
than one edge. We considered non-ambiguous paths valid, and
manually inspected ambiguous paths only. This dramatically
reduced the amount of required effort. Out of 72 detected
sensitives only 31 contained ambiguous paths, and for these
31 most of the paths were non-ambiguous.
Manual inspection: For each ambiguous path we first
identified ambiguous method calls. For each of them, we
performed manual dataflow analysis of the call target, to
determine possible types (e.g. real points-to information). For
this we used the feature ”Analyze Dataflow to Here” from
Android Studio. If manually inferred points-to set was not
compatible with the respective edge in the analyzed path, we
would qualify the path as invalid.
Results: Table II summarizes the results. We found only 3
sensitives with invalid paths out of the total of 72, leading to
a precision of 72−3
72
× 100% = 96%. All invalid paths were
caused by insufficient context sensitivity.
C. RQ3: What is the effect of 1-CFA points-to refinement on
precision?
Methodology: To answer this question we ran DPERM with
GEOM points-to refinement disabled and compared the results
with those of fully enabled DPERM. We’ll refer to the two
configurations as 0-CFA and 1-CFA.
Results: Configuration 0-CFA reported additional paths in 3
apps for 11 sensitives. Of them, 2 sensitives in one app already
had invalid paths with 1-CFA, from RQ2. Thus, the total num-
ber of sensitives with invalid paths was 11−2+3 = 12 . Since
1-CFA is expected to be decidedly more precise than 0-CFA,
7
we consider all the extra paths to be invalid. The number of
additional paths per sensitive was highly nonuniform, ranging
from 1 to 170. The precision for 0-CFA configuration, with
unit of precision being a sensitive, is 72−12
72
× 100% = 83%
This proves that 1-CFA points-to analysis reduces the number
of improperly detected sensitives 4-fold.
Detailed evaluation results can be found on: [19].
VI. STUDIES DERIVED FROM DPSPEC
In this section we present two studies derived from DP-
SPEC and associated tools. In §VI-A we perform a detailed
comparison between DPSPEC and the current state of the art
— Axplorer [10]. In §VI-B we present a small scale study of
declaratively over-privileged apps.
A. Comparison with Axplorer
Next we compare DPSPEC with the most recent work in
this area: Axplorer [10]. For a fair comparison we had to
bring them to a common denominator. Axplorer specifica-
tion contains 307 mappings for methods with both sensitive
and non-sensitive permissions. Since we only study sensitive
permissions, we filtered the specification to exclude the rest,
thus only leaving 45 mappings. In addition, Axplorer does
not support field sensitives. Thus, we excluded field sensitives
from DPERM specification, leaving the 120 method sensitives
only. The two specifications have 27 common mappings, with
no discrepancies w.r.t. referred permissions.
The remaining 18 mappings from Axplorer were new for
DPSPEC. We analyzed all of them to determine whether
they represent true sensitives. For this we used the following
working definition of a sensitive, a slight variation of that
from §III-C : A sensitive is a method that either (a) throws
SecurityException when called without appropriate per-
missions or (b) could be used to access known protected
resources, without having to access other sensitives first.
According to this definition, only 7 of 18 extra mappings in
Axplorer are undoubtedly sensitives: one because it is docu-
mented to throw SecurityException, and 6 by virtue of
their functionality. Out of them three are deprecated. Another
one is modeled by DPERM in a more fine-grained fashion, as a
parametric sensitive. The remaining 10 don’t mention criteria
(a) in their documentation and their functionality doesn’t seem
to satisfy criteria (b).
For example, LocationManager.removeUpdates()
is explicitly documented to require permissions only up to
API22, thus it is not a sensitive on API23. Other methods
represent either similar cleanup operations, status check oper-
ations like SipManager.isOpened() or other operations
that don’t grant access to protected resources. Yet all these
methods plausibly use permission checks under the hood. After
reflecting on these findings, we decided not to merge Axplorer
specification with ours.
Coverage comparison: A larger permission specification
does not necessarily mean better coverage. Thus, we also
compared the permissions coverage that the two specifications
produce on our app corpus. We excluded from both the method
that is modeled differently. In addition, we excluded from
DPSPEC mappings produced by manual inspection (§III-D)
and all mappings for fields. Axplorer specification leads to
32 MCS permission instances, covering only 3 permissions.
In contrast, DPERM produced 69 MCS instances covering 7
permissions. Thus, even for sensitive methods alone it has
more than twice the coverage of Axplorer.
B. Declaratively over-privileged apps
We found one more interesting pattern in Permission Col-
lector data. Declaratively over-privileged apps are those that
declare permissions in the manifest but don’t use them. These
permissions which are neither referred in the code nor con-
sumed by sensitives. Such app will not be over-privileged on
Android 6, but will be on Android 5 or earlier.
Permission Collector found 24 such apps. In 14 of them,
over-declared permissions are in the same groups as other,
properly used permissions. For example, when the app prop-
erly uses ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION, but also declares
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION. In such cases extra permissions
don’t create any visible effects for the user This is because
Android only displays permission groups to the user, but not
individual permissions.
In 10 other cases, over-declared permissions were from
separate groups, making them visible to the user. Such per-
missions could make the user wonder why they are needed
and be skeptical to install the app. We submitted issues for
all apps in this group that have an issue tracker on github,
6 in total. In 3 cases developers replied and fixed the issue.
None of the issues were rejected. Developers gave various
explanations for where these permissions come from. In some
cases they initially considered using the permission, added it
to the manifest, but afterwards found it unnecessary. In one
case the permission was introduced in the manifest by Android
build system, without any intervention from developer, simply
because app linked to certain libraries [20]. Thus, even careful
developers might end up building over-privileged apps without
being aware.
This study confirms that declaratively over-privileged apps,
widely studied before[2, 21, 22], remain frequent on Android
6. Even though developers had a chance to review what
permissions apps really need when performing the migration.
Over-declared permissions are only an issue when either the
phone or the app run or is built for older Android versions.
Thus, there is a necessity to migrate both phones and apps to
newer OS versions, and to provide tools that facilitate apps
migration.
There is one more application of this section’ study. An-
droid Studio has a code inspection/warning called ”Calling a
method that requires a permission without having declared
that permission in the manifest”. The inspection uses per-
mission annotations (§III-A), which we showed to be vastly
incomplete. Thus, it is of limited usability. Using the exten-
sive specification from this study would allow both a wider
applicability of the inspection but also the opposite inspection.
Now Android Studio could issue a warning if permission is
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declared without being used, with small false positive rates.
We provided DPSPEC to Google engineers, to help them
update permission annotations.
VII. RELATED WORK
We divide the related work in two categories: research
dedicated to inferring permission mappings for Android, and
research related to runtime permission usages in mobile apps.
A. Inferring Permission Mappings
Stowaway [2] was the first research aimed to produce a com-
prehensive permission specification. They used automatic test
generation to exercise Android API, and modified the internal
permission check mechanism to log all permission checks
within Android. The resulting specification still contained a
number of inconsistencies which required manual inspection.
One inconsistency is methods whose permissions depend on
received argument, which we model as parametric sensitives.
The final specification was precise yet incomplete. In addition,
Stowaway only analyzed Android 2.2.
The next major effort in this area was PScout [9]. Similarly
to DPERM it constructs a call graph and performs reachability
traversal. Unlike DPERM it analyzes Android Framework code
and looks for Android internal permission checks. Due do
difficulty to scale analysis to the whole Android, PScout
used the imprecise CHA-based call graph generation. PScout
produces a vastly larger specification than Stowaway, yet
it suffers from imprecision. The evaluation they perform is
coarse-grained. For a corpus of apps, permissions declared
in the manifest are compared with permissions inferred from
PScout specification. The paper states the upper bound of false
mappings of 7%. It is easy to see what could be missed by
this evaluation. If two methods are always used together, yet
only one of them requires permissions, the evaluation won’t
be able to determine which one is that.
At the moment DPERM project started, PScout was
the most recent permission specification available. We
considered to use it, but soon realized the precision
problem. A quick look at PScout specification
for API225 reveals many implausible mappings, like
android.app.UiAutomation: getWindows()
requiring CHANGE_WIFI_STATE. Thus we decided to build
our own specification.
The state of the art in generating an automatic permission
specification is Axplorer [10]. It follows the same key idea
as PScout. Axplorer builds on top of PScout through more
precise modeling of Android internals. Also, instead of CHA,
they use the more precise points-to based call graph. To over-
come scalability problem, Axplorer is run on more powerful
hardware. Being the most recent, this is the only project
to analyze Android 6. Axplorer was evaluated relatively to
PScout only. The evaluation revealed superior precision, both
due to correct engineering and better analysis. As we show
in this paper, Axplorer specification is fairly precise, yet
5https://github.com/zyrikby/PScout/blob/master/results/API\ 22/
publishedapimapping
contains few mappings for dangerous permissions, ultimately
producing less than half the coverage of permissions used by
apps compared to DPSPEC.
Copes [23] is a tool that discovers over-privileged apps for
Android 2.2. This work also produces a permission specifica-
tion using reachability analysis of Android Framework, similar
to PScout. They use SPARK to generate the call graph, but
have a simplified model of Android internals. Copes specifica-
tion was not evaluated. To detect over-privilege, Copes project
includes a tool similar to our Permission Collector (§III-B).
In contrast with previous efforts, DPSPEC is built from
available documentation sources, plus to a small degree from
permission usages in apps. Its precision is bounded by the
correction of this documentation and our methodology. For
DPERM, we use a precise evaluation of each individual path,
capable of producing absolute precision and recall values. In
principle, similar evaluation could be used for other reacha-
bility analyses, including PScout and Axplorer.
In a slightly different context, Kratos [24] is another tool
that performs reachability analysis on Android Framework.
Kratos searches inconsistencies in permission check mech-
anism that could allow apps to access resources without
appropriate permissions.
B. Runtime Permissions in Mobile Apps
The only other tool to our knowledge that analyzes runtime
permissions for Android is revDroid [18]. It searches for bugs
that arise when permissions are checked too far away from
where they are used. These bugs can lead to crashes when
permissions are revoked while app is running. Yet revDroid
incorrectly assumes that the bug happens any time a the
permission check and the sensitive are in different callbacks.
Similar to DPERM, revDroid is based on Soot and FlowDroid
platform. Different from DPERM, revDroid uses PScout spec-
ification, context-insensitive SPARK call graph and default
FlowDroid entry point generation. The paper doesn’t present
any solution for call graph incompleteness. As a result of these
shortcomings, the paper finds that 46% of sensitives have their
permissions checked improperly, which we believe is a vast
overstatement. revDroid paper has no evaluation.
We are also interested in extending DPERM with analysis of
permission checks. This requires significantly more complex
modeling of Android components lifecycle for good precision.
Livshits and Jung [25] proposed a tool for instrumenting
Windows Phone (WP) apps with permission prompts. There
is one conceptual difference between this tool and DPERM. On
WP permission prompts can be placed anywhere in the app
binary code. They cannot be placed only inside dll libraries.
In contrast, on Android requests have to be propagated to
the calling callback. As a result, WP tool places prompts
straight in front of the protected resource in most cases. Being
less concerned with precision of interprocedural propagation,
they use CHA call graph, which also does not suffer from
incompleteness.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We first presented DPSPEC, produced from various doc-
umentation sources using straightforward tools and careful
interpretation on ambiguities. It is essentially the first attempt
to gather in one piece all the documentation on permissions
available in Android SDK. Yet, even the simple evaluation
and comparison that we performed led to a number of con-
clusions, somewhat expected in outcome but surprising in
magnitude. First, we have a definitive evidence that Android
SDK documentation is incomplete and this complicates the life
of developers when dealing with permissions. Second, even
the state of the art tools for building permission specifications
from source code produce vastly incomplete results, even when
carefully modeling android internals.
DPSPEC complements these efforts by providing a better
benchmark with which to compare, so that limitations could
be easily spotted and discrepancies could be explained, thus
driving future advancements in the area. In addition, it is
ready to be used in any application in which a permission
specification is needed. We also provided the specification to
Google engineers to help them extend permission annotations.
With relatively little effort, it is possible to maintain up to date
specifications for newer versions of Android.
We presented DPERM, a highly complete and precise
analysis for recommending permission request locations. In
fact Android Studio already has an inspection with the same
goal, but it is severely limited in at least two ways. First it
only supports sensitives in annotations. Second, the inspection
reports issues at the location of sensitive, without propagating
it inter-procedurally. DPSPEC and DPERM are out of the
box solutions ready to be plugged into this inspection for
dramatically better results.
We envision DPERM as the first step towards a comprehen-
sive tool suite that would allow developers (a) automatically
migrate all protected resources to runtime model, (b) maintain
correct permission requests for evolving apps that have already
been migrated. For this, we intend to extend DPERM with (i)
storage permissions, (ii) an inter-component communication
model (for example by integration with IccTA [26]), and (iii)
an analysis of permission checks. The extended tool should
be able to correctly detect bugs studied in [18] as well as a
number of other issues related to runtime permissions, thus
providing long-term benefits for Android community.
REFERENCES
[1] R. Stevens, J. Ganz, V. Filkov, P. Devanbu, and
H. Chen, “Asking for (and about) permissions used
by android apps,” in Proceedings of the 10th Working
Conference on Mining Software Repositories, ser. MSR
’13. Piscataway, NJ, USA: IEEE Press, 2013, pp. 31–
40. [Online]. Available: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?
id=2487085.2487093
[2] A. P. Felt, E. Chin, S. Hanna, D. Song, and
D. Wagner, “Android permissions demystified,” in
Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, ser. CCS ’11. New
York, NY, USA: ACM, 2011, pp. 627–638. [Online].
Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2046707.2046779
[3] B. P. Sarma, N. Li, C. Gates, R. Potharaju, C. Nita-
Rotaru, and I. Molloy, “Android permissions: A
perspective combining risks and benefits,” in Proceedings
of the 17th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models
and Technologies, ser. SACMAT ’12. New York, NY,
USA: ACM, 2012, pp. 13–22. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2295136.2295141
[4] J. Sellwood and J. Crampton, “Sleeping android: The
danger of dormant permissions,” in Proceedings of
the Third ACM Workshop on Security and Privacy in
Smartphones &#38; Mobile Devices, ser. SPSM ’13.
New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2013, pp. 55–66. [Online].
Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2516760.2516774
[5] P. Wijesekera, A. Baokar, A. Hosseini, S. Egelman,
D. Wagner, and K. Beznosov, “Android permissions
remystified: A field study on contextual integrity,” in
Proceedings of the 24th USENIX Conference on Security
Symposium, ser. SEC’15. Berkeley, CA, USA: USENIX
Association, 2015, pp. 499–514. [Online]. Available:
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2831143.2831175
[6] (2015) Mapping between android permissions to
corresponding api calls methods. [Online]. Available:
http://stackoverflow.com/a/24019120
[7] (2016) How to find required android marshmallow
runtime permissions in code? [Online]. Available:
http://stackoverflow.com/q/34679400
[8] (2015) Migrating to runtime permissions: How do you
find all the current permission uses? [Online]. Available:
http://stackoverflow.com/q/32656505
[9] K. W. Y. Au, Y. F. Zhou, Z. Huang, and D. Lie, “Pscout:
Analyzing the android permission specification,” in
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, ser. CCS ’12. New
York, NY, USA: ACM, 2012, pp. 217–228. [Online].
Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2382196.2382222
[10] M. Backes, S. Bugiel, E. Derr, P. McDaniel,
D. Octeau, and S. Weisgerber, “On demystifying
the android application framework: Re-visiting
android permission specification analysis,” in
25th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX
Security 16). Austin, TX: USENIX Association,
10
2016, pp. 1101–1118. [Online]. Available:
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity16/
technical-sessions/presentation/backes android
[11] (2015) Normal and dangerous permissions. [On-
line]. Available: https://developer.android.com/guide/
topics/permissions/requesting.html
[12] (2015) Normal and dangerous permissions. [Online].
Available: https://developer.android.com/training/articles/
user-data-permissions.html
[13] R. Valle´e-Rai, P. Co, E. Gagnon, L. Hendren, P. Lam,
and V. Sundaresan, “Soot: A java bytecode optimization
framework,” in CASCON First Decade High Impact
Papers, ser. CASCON ’10. Riverton, NJ, USA:
IBM Corp., 2010, pp. 214–224. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1925805.1925818
[14] S. Arzt, S. Rasthofer, C. Fritz, E. Bodden, A. Bartel,
J. Klein, Y. Le Traon, D. Octeau, and P. McDaniel,
“Flowdroid: Precise context, flow, field, object-sensitive
and lifecycle-aware taint analysis for android apps,” in
Proceedings of the 35th ACM SIGPLAN Conference
on Programming Language Design and Implementation,
ser. PLDI ’14. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2014,
pp. 259–269. [Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.
1145/2594291.2594299
[15] O. Lhotak, “Program analysis using binary decision
diagrams,” Ph.D. dissertation, Montreal, Que., Canada,
Canada, 2006, aAINR25195.
[16] O. Lhota´k and L. Hendren, “Scaling java points-to
analysis using spark,” in Proceedings of the 12th
International Conference on Compiler Construction, ser.
CC’03. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2003, pp.
153–169. [Online]. Available: http://dl.acm.org/citation.
cfm?id=1765931.1765948
[17] X. Xiao and C. Zhang, “Geometric encoding: Forging
the high performance context sensitive points-to analysis
for java,” in Proceedings of the 2011 International
Symposium on Software Testing and Analysis, ser.
ISSTA ’11. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2011,
pp. 188–198. [Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.
1145/2001420.2001443
[18] Z. Fang, W. Han, D. Li, Z. Guo, D. Guo, X. S.
Wang, Z. Qian, and H. Chen, “revdroid: Code analysis
of the side effects after dynamic permission revocation
of android apps,” in Proceedings of the 11th ACM
on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, ser. ASIA CCS ’16. New York, NY,
USA: ACM, 2016, pp. 747–758. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2897845.2897914
[19] (2017, Feb) Droidperm study. [Online]. Available:
anonymous
[20] (2015, Jun) Hey, where did these
permissions come from? [Online]. Available:
https://commonsware.com/blog/2015/06/25/
hey-where-did-these-permissions-come-from.html
[21] A. Atzeni, T. Su, M. Baltatu, R. D’Alessandro,
and G. Pessiva, “How dangerous is your android
app?: An evaluation methodology,” in Proceedings
of the 11th International Conference on Mobile
and Ubiquitous Systems: Computing, Networking and
Services, ser. MOBIQUITOUS ’14. ICST, Brussels,
Belgium, Belgium: ICST (Institute for Computer
Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications
Engineering), 2014, pp. 130–139. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.4108/icst.mobiquitous.2014.257832
[22] J. Sellwood and J. Crampton, “Sleeping android: The
danger of dormant permissions,” in Proceedings of
the Third ACM Workshop on Security and Privacy in
Smartphones &#38; Mobile Devices, ser. SPSM ’13.
New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2013, pp. 55–66. [Online].
Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2516760.2516774
[23] A. Bartel, J. Klein, Y. Le Traon, and M. Monperrus,
“Automatically securing permission-based software by
reducing the attack surface: An application to android,”
in Proceedings of the 27th IEEE/ACM International
Conference on Automated Software Engineering, ser.
ASE 2012. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2012,
pp. 274–277. [Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.
1145/2351676.2351722
[24] Y. Shao, Q. A. Chen, Z. M. Mao, J. Ott, and Z. Qian,
“Kratos: Discovering inconsistent security policy en-
forcement in the android framework,” in NDSS, 2016.
[25] B. Livshits and J. Jung, “Automatic mediation of privacy-
sensitive resource access in smartphone applications,”
in Proceedings of the 22Nd USENIX Conference on
Security, ser. SEC’13. Berkeley, CA, USA: USENIX
Association, 2013, pp. 113–130. [Online]. Available:
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2534766.2534777
[26] L. Li, A. Bartel, T. F. Bissyande´, J. Klein, Y. Le Traon,
S. Arzt, S. Rasthofer, E. Bodden, D. Octeau, and
P. McDaniel, “Iccta: Detecting inter-component privacy
leaks in android apps,” in Proceedings of the 37th
International Conference on Software Engineering -
Volume 1, ser. ICSE ’15. Piscataway, NJ, USA:
IEEE Press, 2015, pp. 280–291. [Online]. Available:
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2818754.2818791
11
